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The court emphasizes the fact that the drafts in question were not
ordinary drafts in that they contained statements of their purpose to
release claims against the insurance company, and that the fraudulent
agent was a regular depositor in the defendant bank. The court then
says: "It does not seem to us a sufficient answer to all this to say that,
within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Act the drafts were
payable to fictitious payees, even assuming such to be the legal effect of
what was done." While it might be argued that the provision for release
in the drafts was for the purpose of protecting the insurance company
from further liability on the same claims, and not to protect it against
forgery, the presence of such a provision furnished additional evidence
of negligence on the part of the defendant.
Viewed in this light there can be no doubt but that the court was
seeking to perform substantial justice, and it probably succeeded. And
this is none the less true because a different result was reached in a case
in the federal court with respect to the same sort of drafts, 2 for the
attending facts in that case were such as to negative any claim of
negligence on the part of the defendant. V. L. A.
PROCEDURE
PROCEDURE - PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY IN ACTION
AGAINST CORPORATIONS FOR TORTS OF STATUTORY
POLICE EMPLOYEES
In a recent federal case, Brie Railroad v. Johnson,1 plaintiff sued
the defendant railroad company alleging an assault and battery, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution by three railroad police officers
commissioned by the Governor and compensated by the defendant,
pursuant to sections 915 o and 9151 of the Ohio General Code. The
latter section provides "policemen so appointed, and commissioned sev-
erally shall possess and exercise the powers, and be subject to the
liabilities of policemen of cities in the several counties in which they are
authorized to act while discharging the duties for which they are
appointed." Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that the three police
officers, one of whom was a lieutenant, while investigating a reported
theft of railroad propery, discovered plaintiff in an abandoned garage
of an oil company, where he was seeking shelter from the rain; they
"Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Fifth Third Union Trust Co., 23 F. Supp.
53 (Ohio 1938). Note (1939) 6 Un. of Chi. L. Rev. 700.
'Erie R. v. Johnson, io6 F. (zd) SO (1939).
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told him they were railroad detectives and demanded to know what
he had done with the company's property which they claimed he had
stolen; he was assaulted both at the time of the first encounter and
again while on the way to the police station where he was locked up.
The following morning one of the officers executed an affidavit charging
plaintiff with breaking and entering a railroad car belonging to defend-
ant. Upon trial these charges were dismissed for lack of evidence. In
plaintiff's suit against the railroad company the Federal District Court
sent the case to the jury, holding that the evidence was sufficient to
ra;se a jury question, whether the acts of the officers were outside their
public duties and authorized by the railroad. The jury found that the
officers were acting for the defendant and not in their official capacity.
Judgment for plaintiff was rendered on the verdict. The Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the judgment holding that there was not sufficient
evidence to go to the jury, on this same question,--whether the acts of
the officers were outside their public duties and authorized by the
railroad.
The holding is based upon Ohio law, under the rule of Erie Rail-
road v. Tompkins.2 The court cites Ry. Co. v. Fieback3 and Pa. R. R.
v. Deal' for the Ohio law: that a railroad company is not liable for the
wrongful acts of such an officer unless such wrongful acts occurred in
the performance of an act authorized by the Company and outside the
scope of the public duties of a policeman. In the Deal case, however,
the evidence on this point was held sufficient to go to the jury. It there
appeared that a company clerk had been assaulted by thieves while
attempting to drive them away from a box car; subsequently he con-
ferred with a railroad police officer,' who determined, on the advice of
his captain in the railroad police force, to prosecute the thieves, for the
reason that the officer did not want his men beaten up while protecting
the railroad's propery. Accordingly the clerk made affidavit against one
Deal on authority of the railroad police officer, but upon appearance of
the accused, the clerk admitted that it was a case of mistaken identity
and Deal was discharged. In the subsequent action for malicious prose-
cution brought by Deal against the railroad company the Common
Pleas Court sent the case to the jury and its action was upheld by the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
The Fieback case states the Ohio law on this point, as held by the
Circuit Court of Appeals in the instant case, that the one paying the
3o4 U.S. 64, Sz L. Ed. 188, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
S 7 Ohio St. 254, 0oo N.E. n59, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1x64 (191z).
xx6 Ohio St. 408, x56 N.E. 502 (19Z7).
'In this and subsequent cases all the police odficers referred to were appointed under
public authority and their salary was paid by the respective defendants.
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salary is not liable unless there is a previous authorization or a subsequent
ratification. In the Deal case, however, the Ohio Supreme Court recog-
nized this to be the law, but held that previous authorization or subse-
quent ratification is a question for the jury on facts similar to those in
the principal case. Undoubtedly the Circuit Court of Appeals felt that
the case before it was distinguishable from the Deal case, but it is sub-
mitted that this distinction is difficult to recognize.' It should be noted,
however, that Judge Allen, one of the judges who concurred in the
opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the instant case, had also
concurred in the per curiam opinion in the Ohio case.
The second Ohio case" tempered the harsh rule stated in the first.'
It is regrettable that the federal reviewing court in the instant case
found it necessary to reverse the action of the District Court, which
had merely recognized the tempering.
In the only other Ohio case' on this point, the Court of Appeals
sent the case to the jury. There the officer, on authority of his lieutenant
in the plant police force, wrongfully assaulted the plaintiff, while at-
tempting to apprehend another man discovered stealing property of
the defendant.
Cases in other jurisdictions involving company police, which have
been sent to the jury on this issue of official or non-official action,
include a Maryland case1" where a lieutenant in the railroad detective
force, appointed under a similar statute, having ordered plaintiff off a
train, illegally shot him when he was several feet from the train; a New
York case," practically identical to the Maryland case; and a Kentucky
case12 where three constables, appointed under local law and paid by
defendant to keep order about a depot, to meet incoming trains, and to
arrest persons who were drunk or disorderly, went onto a train to arrest
the plaintiff for breach of peace and wrongfully assaulted her. Courts
of Texas'" and Alabama 4 have also held in similar cases that there was
aIn fact, if a distinction is to be made, it may be argued that the federal case pre-
sents more evidence to take to the jury than does the Deal case. In the latter the detectives
were merely attempting to get a conviction of the thieves who had in the past assaulted
the railroad company's clerk in order that in the future the railroad detectives themselves
would not be assaulted while protecting company property; whereas in the federal case
the special police officers were directly concerned with recovering the railroad company's
property-an enterprise which might be regarded as more closely identified with the com-
pany's interests.
See note 4, supra.
8 See note 3, supra.
o Republic St. Corp. v. Sontag, z Ohio L. Abs., No. 13, 358 (93S).
'0 Deck v. B. & 0. R. Co., moo Md. z68, 59 Ati. 65o, ioS Am. St. Rep. 339 (19o5).
" Sharp v. Erie R. R. Co., 184 N.Y. 1oo (sgo6).
"
t mLouisville & N. R. Co. v. Mason, 199 Ky. 337, Z51 S.W. 184 (923).
"
5 M. K. & T. Ry. v. John Warner, g Tex. Civ. App. 463, 49 S.W. zS4 (1898)5
Perkins Bros. v. Anderson, x5s S.W. SS6 (Tex. 1913).
" Sciplo v. Pioneer Mining Co., 166 Ala. 666, 5Z So. 43 (1910).
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sufficient evidence to go to the jury on whether or not a certain act of
a special officer appointed under public authority was done in his official
capacity or for the employer who paid his salary.
There are of course numerous cases involving special policemen
which sustain the direction of a verdict for the defendant employer, but
practically all of these have features distinguishing them from the prin-
cipal case."5 In the leading case, decided by the Maryland courts,"6
the arrest was made by a special policeman off the premises, on the
authority of defendant's superintendent, who was not shown to have
acted within his authority in so directing the policeman; there was no
claim of benefit to defendant or preservation of its property, and the
superintendent, although bearing an important title, was not, in the
opinion of the court, acting within the scope of his authority. In a West
Virginia case' the court affirmed the trial court's action in setting aside
a verdict for the plaintiff and drew a distinction between the acts of an
officer for the protection of the defendant's property and acts based on
other motives; in this case the officer's purpose was to protect his own
wife, who he thought was being molested by the plaintiff. A North
Dakota court held that the protection of the defendant's property was
not involved in a case which the plaintiff was beaten up by a special
policeman after leaving the defendant's train;" there the officer had
chased the plaintiff about town and had arrested and assaulted him upon
his subsequent return to the vicinity of the depot. Two federal cases"
and a California case"0 on this subject are as readily distinguishable.
A further point involved in the principal case may be noted. The
federal court was compelled to reverse and remand the case to the trial
court in accordance with federal procedure, and could not render final
judgment for the defendant, although it held that the trial court should
have done so.' The Ohio appellate court would have been permitted
' Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Offut, 2o Ky. Si, 263 S.W. 665 (1924) held as a
matter of law that corporations are liable for the acts of their special policemen appointed
under a statute similar to Ohio's, but in its opinion the court recognizes that the decision
i.' in conflict with the majority rule.
' Tolchester Beach Improvement Co. v. Steinmeier) 7Z Md. 313, 2o Atl. 188, 8
L.R.A. 846 (9Sgo).
17 McKain v. B. & 0. R.R., 65 AV. Va. z33, 64 S.E. IS, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) z89(1909).
1 imonen v. Gr. AN. Ry. Co., 34 N.D. S56, xzS N.W. ioNS (x916).
" Pa. Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 481, 101 C.C.A., 359, 177 Fed. 189
(91o)5 Hershey v. O'Neill, 36 Fed. 168 (sSSS).
"Maggi v. Pompa, IOS Cal. App. 496, 287 Pac. 9Sz (1930).
ClSlocum v N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 33 Sup. Ct. 523, 57 L.Ed. 879, Ann.
Cas. 1914 D, 1029 (xgz); Pederson v. Del., L. & TV. Ry. Co., 229 U.S. 146, 33
Sup. Ct. 648, Ann Cas. 1914 C, 153 (1913); Engemoen v. Chi., St., P., M & 0. Ry. Co.,
z2o Fed. 896 (1914); Fid. Title & Tr. Co. v. Dubois Elee. Co., 253 U.S. 212, 64 L.Ed.
86S, 40 Sup. Ct. 54 (1920). Where the trial court reserves decision on the motion for a
directed verdict and submits the case to the jury, thereafter entering judgment on the ver-
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to render final judgment for defendant; in fact, it would have been
error for it not to have done so. 2 The federal rule laid down in the
Slocum case," is based on the right of trial by jury guaranteed by the
7th Amendment to the United State Constitution; it is said that when
a verdict is set aside the issues are left undetermined, and until they are
determined in a jury trial no judgment on the merits can be given. In
a persuasive dissent written by Hughes, J., and concurred in by Holmes,
Lurton, and Pitney, JJ., the view is expressed that the rendition of
final judgment by the reviewing court would not be a violation of the
7 th Amendment since the court would be deciding a question of law,
not of fact, that is, whether there was sufficient evidence to go to the
jury. In a later case 4 the Supreme Court sustained the rule of the
Slocum case without a dissent. The Ohio Supreme Court finds no
constitutional difficulty in rendering final judgment,2" relying on an
argument similar to that expressed in the dissenting opinion in the
Slocum case. Moreover, the Ohio courts are authorized by statute to
render final judgment in such cases. H. M. M.
REAL PROPERTY
REAL PROPERTY - TERMINATION OF A LEASE BY
FORECLOSURE OF PRIOR MORTGAGE
In 1926, Kenyon Painter executed a mortgage to the plaintiff, the
New York Life Insurance Company, and in 1931 leased the premises
for a seventy-month term to the Simplex Products Corporation, defend-
ant in the case at bar. The defendant paid rent to Painter until Sep-
tember, 1933, when by agreement payment of part of the rent was
made to the plaintiff while the remainder was paid to the Union Trust
Company, which held a mortgage on the residue of the leased property.
In December, 1934, the plaintiff brought an action to foreclose his
mortgage, but failed to join the defendant-lessee as a party. Plaintiff
dict, the reviewing court can render final judgment rather than remand the case for a new
trial if it holds that there was not sufficient evidence to go to the jury. Baltim. & Carol.
Line v. Redman, 55 Sup. Ct. 89o. Note 45 Yale L.J. 166 (1935) zs Ia. L. Rev. 117
( 5 Majoros v. Cleve. Lner. Rd. Co., 127 Ohio St. z5g, 187 N.E. 857 (1933); Crey-
hound Lines v. Martin, 127 Ohio St. 499, 189 N.E. 244, 14 Ohio L. Abs. 327 (934)i
Lakeside Hosp. v. Kover, 131 Ohio St. 333, z N.E. (2d) 857, 6 Ohio Op. 54 (1936).
23 See note 21, supra.
24 Pederson v. Del., L. & W. R. Co., note 22, supra.
"
1 Keller v. Stark Elec. Ry. Co., ioz Ohio St. 254, 13o N.E. 5o8, sz Ohio App. 3z6
(292i); Ellis and Morton v. Ohio Life Ins. Co. , 4 Ohio St. 628, 64. Am. Dec. 6zo, i
Hand. 97, sz Ohio Dec. Rep. 47, 1 Hand. i9, sz Ohio Dec. Rep. 58 (1855).
2 G.C. sec. 2Z223-38.
